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CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES WHEN
EXCLUSIVE REPAIR REMEDIES FAIL:
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
SECTION 2-719
HENRY MATHER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article offers a simple solution to a difficult problem.
The problem arises when a seller of goods breaches a warranty,
an exclusive repair or replace remedy fails of its essential purpose, and the buyer seeks consequential damages despite a contractual exclusion of such damages. In hypothetical terms, suppose that Seller and Buyer enter into a contract for the sale of
goods to be manufactured by Seller and used by Buyer (who is
not a consumer) in the ordinary course of its business. The written agreement includes an express warranty of quality and provides that the exclusive remedy for breach of this warranty will
be repair or replacement, by Seller and at Seller's expense, of
any portion of the goods that proves to be defective.1 The written agreement also contains a provision explicitly excluding consequential damages. 2 Seller delivers the goods to Buyer, the war* Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. B.A., 1959, University of Rochester; M.A., 1961, Columbia University; J.D., 1970, Cornell University.
The author thanks Ricky Barbare for his diligent assistance in research.
1. The following language would be typical:
Seller warrants the equipment to be free from defects in material or workmanship for a period of twelve months from the date of delivery. In case of any
such defects, Seller will, free of charge, either repair such defects or, at its
option, deliver new parts or equipment in place of that found defective. This
repair or replacement will be Buyer's sole and exclusive remedy for breach of
warranty and will be the limit of Seller's liability for any breach of warranty.
See S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363, 1366 n.2 (9th Cir. 1978); AES
Technology Sys. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933, 938 (7th Cir. 1978); Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39, 41 n.2 (N.D. InI. 1970).
We will assume that Seller has effectively disclaimed all implied warranties and that
the express warranty is thus the only warranty that can be breached.
2. The following language would be typical:
Seller will not be liable for consequential damages of any kind, including, but
not limited to, loss of use of the equipment and loss of profits.
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ranty is breached, and Seller is given adequate notice of the
nature of the breach. Seller is, however, either unwilling or unable to repair or replace the defective goods within a reasonable
time. May Buyer recover consequential damages despite the
contractual exclusion?
The transaction is governed by Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (the "Code"). 3 Section 2-719(1) of the Code
provides that the agreement may limit the buyer's remedies to
repair or replacement of nonconforming goods or parts, and if
such remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, it is the sole
remedy. 4 But section 2-719(2) states that when circumstances
cause an exclusive remedy to "fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act." 5 Because Seller has
failed to repair or replace the defective goods within a reasonable time, the exclusive repair or replace remedy has failed of its
essential purpose.' A buyer's Code remedies for breach of warranty include consequential damages.

See Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 775 F.2d 587, 590 (4th Cir. 1985); Agristor Credit
Corp. v. Schmidlin, 601 F. Supp. 1307, 1314 (D. Or. 1985); Jones & McKnight Corp., 320
F. Supp. at 41 n.2.
3. Article 2 applies to transactions in goods. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1977).
4. U.C.C. § 2-719(1) (1977).
5. Id. § 2-719(2). The official comments state that "under subsection (2), where an
apparently fair and reasonable clause because of circumstances fails in its purpose or
operates to deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it must give way
to the general remedy provisions of this Article." Id. § 2-719 comment 1.
6. An exclusive repair or replace remedy fails of its essential purpose whenever the
warrantor fails to correct the defect within a reasonable period. Beal v. General Motors
Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 426 (D. Del. 1973). Beal has been followed in numerous decisions. See, e.g., Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1371 n.1 (8th Cir. 1977);
Custom Automated Mach. v. Penda Corp., 537 F. Supp. 77, 83 (N.D. Ill.
1982); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Harrell, 431 So. 2d 156, 164 (Ala. 1983); Clark v. International
Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 340, 581 P.2d 784, 798 (1978); Givan v. Mack Truck, Inc.,
569 S.W.2d 243, 247 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d
406, 421, 265 N.W.2d 513, 521 (1978).
The purpose of the exclusive remedy is explained in Beal as follows:
The purpose of an exclusive remedy of replacement or repair of defective
parts, whose presence constitutes a breach of an express warranty, is to give
the seller an opportunity to make the goods conforming while limiting the risks
to which he is subject by excluding direct and consequential damages that
might otherwise arise. From the point of view of the buyer the purpose of the
exclusive remedy is to give him goods that conform to the contract within a
reasonable time after a defective part is discovered.
354 F. Supp. at 426.
7. We will assume that Buyer has accepted the goods and that the time for revocation of acceptance has expired without any revocation. Buyer's statutory remedy for
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Our analysis thus far suggests that Buyer may recover consequential damages subject to the usual limitations, such as the
requirement that Buyer's consequential loss be foreseeable to
Seller.8 We must, however, consider section 2-719(3) which
states: "Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.", Has our
Buyer not agreed to exclude consequential damages? We will assume that the exclusion clause in the agreement is not unconscionable. 10 May we not conclude that Buyer is entitled to any
applicable Code remedy for breach of warranty except consequential damages?
In understanding why a problem exists, it is helpful to distinguish the instant hypothetical transaction from two situations
that do not present a problem. When the written agreement con-

breach of warranty is thus provided by U.C.C. § 2-714 (1977). See also id. comment 1.

Section 2-714(2) specifies the normal measure of damages for breach of warranty: the
difference between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have bad if
they had been as warranted. Id. § 2-714(2). Subsection (3) states that in a proper case
consequential damages under § 2-715 may also be recovered. Id. § 2-714(3). The term
"consequential damages" is not defined in the Code. See id. § 1-106 comment 3. Losses
caused by a seller's breach of warranty but not measured by the section 2-714(2) difference in value, and not regarded as incidental losses governed by section 2-715(1), are
likely to be treated as consequential losses governed by section 2-715(2). Consequential
damages typically compensate buyers for personal injury, injury to buyer's property
other than the warranted goods, profits lost by buyer in connection with other transactions, and buyer's liability to third parties. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMRS,HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10-4, at 391-93 (2d ed. 1980). Consequential damages usually compensate buyers for losses involving things or transactions
beyond the scope of the subject matter of the contract breached by seller.
If a buyer effectively revokes acceptance of the defective goods, the buyer's statutory
remedy is governed by § 2-712 or § 2-713. U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (1977). Under either § 2712(2) or § 2-713(1), a buyer would be entitled to consequential damages. See id. §§ 2712(2), -713(1).
8. Buyer's consequential damages for economic loss (such as lost profits) are limited
to losses "resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller
at the time of contracting had reason to know." U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1977).
9. Id. § 2-719(3). Subsection (3) goes on to state: "Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable
but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not." Id. The problem dealt
with in this Article is thus most likely to arise when the buyer is not a consumer.
10. Because our Buyer is a business enterprise and not a consumer, the exclusion of
consequential damages is not prima facie unconscionable. See supra note 9. We will assume that Buyer is represented by competent executives and legal counsel, that Buyer is
not a victim of unfair surprise and does not suffer from inferior bargaining power, and
that there are no other grounds for finding the consequential damages clause unconscionable. For a discussion of unconscionability in contracts between business enterprises, see
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7,
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tains a clause excluding consequential damages but does not
limit the buyer's remedies to repair or replacement, no problem
exists. Assuming the exclusion of consequential damages is not
unconscionable, the buyer is not entitled to consequential damages. Section 2-719(3) validates the exclusion of consequential
damages, and section 2-719(2) never comes into play because
there is no limited or exclusive remedy to fail of its essential
purpose. Likewise, when the written agreement provides that repair or replacement is the buyer's exclusive remedy but does not
contain an explicit exclusion of consequential damages, no problem exists. If the exclusive repair remedy fails of its essential
purpose, section 2-719(2) gives a buyer his Article 2 remedies,
including consequential damages. The problem arises when, as
in our hypothetical transaction, the exclusive repair remedy fails
of its essential purpose and the written agreement expressly provides that the buyer cannot recover consequential damages. In
such a case, section 2-719(2) seems to indicate that the buyer
can recover consequential damages, while section 2-719(3) suggests that the buyer cannot recover them.
II.

CONFLICTING COURT DECISIONS

Whether the buyer may recover consequential damages in
this situation is one of the most frequently litigated issues arising from the Code. There is, unfortunately, no consensus among
the courts on how the issue should be resolved. Differing analytical approaches have produced conflicting decisions. The decisions can be divided into at least five different groups.
A.

Five Judicial Approaches

One group of decisions holds that if the exclusive repair

remedy fails of its essential purpose, the buyer is automatically
entitled to all Code remedies, including consequential damages,
even though the written agreement excluded consequential damages." These decisions result from a straightforward application
11, R.W. Murray, Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266, 272-73 (8th Cir.
1985); Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1373 (8th Cir. 1977); Northern
States Power Co. v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 550 F. Supp. 108, 112-13 (D. Minn. 1982);
Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 382 (E.D. Mich.
1977); Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39, 44 (N.D. Ill. 1970);
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of subsection (2) of section 2-719, with little or no attention paid

to subsection (3). In Soo Line Railroad Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 2
for example, the court considered whether the seller should be
exonerated from liability for consequential damages because the
contract contained a specific bar against such damages. The
court's conclusion that the contract did not effectively bar liability for consequential damages was based in large part on its observation that "the fundamental intent of section 2-719(2) reflects that a remedial limitation's failure of essential purpose
makes available all contractual remedies, including consequential damages authorized pursuant to sections 2-714 and 2-715. "13
The court did not mention section 2-719(3).
A second line of decisions goes to the other extreme and
holds that so long as the clause excluding consequential damages
is not unconscionable, the buyer is absolutely precluded from recovering consequential damages.1 4 These decisions focus on subsection (3) of section 2-719 and give it an effect that is independent of the failure of the exclusive remedy's essential purpose.
One court observed that subsection (3) is meant to allow freedom in excluding consequential damages unless a consumer is
involved and suggested that this freedom would be abridged if
subsection (2) were interpreted to make all Code remedies automatically available when the exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose. 5 The court concluded that subsection (3) rather

Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Laird, 432 So. 2d 1259, 1264 (Ala. 1983) (farmer buyer); Kalil
Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 127 Ariz. 278, 281-82, 619 P.2d 1055, 1058-59 (Ct. App.
1980); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Waterson, 13 Ark. App. 77, 84, 86, 679 S.W.2d 814, 819,
820 (1984); Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago S., 310 N.W.2d 71, 75, 78 (Minn.
1981) (consumer buyer); Goddard v. General Motors Corp., 60 Ohio St. 2d 41, 47-49, 396
N.E.2d 761, 765-66 (1979) (consumer buyer).
12. 547 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977).
13. Id. at 1373.
14. Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d
427, 434, 435 (6th Cir. 1983); Chatlos Sys. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d
1081, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980); Fibematics, Inc. v. Web Sys., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1600, 1603 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 78788 (E.D. Wis, 1982) (dictum); County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'g Corp., 323
F. Supp. 1300, 1309 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
939 (1971); Xerox Corp. v. Hawkes, 124 N.H. 610, 619-20, 475 A.2d 7, 12 (1984) (dictum);
Stutts v. Green Ford, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 503, 515-16, 267 S.E.2d 919, 926 (1980); Johnson
v. John Deere Co., 306 N.W.2d 231, 238 (S.D. 1981) (farmer buyer).
15. See Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage Co., 709
F.2d 427, 435 (6th Cir. 1983).
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than subsection (2) governs the exclusion of consequential damages and the buyer cannot recover consequential damages unless
the exclusion clause is unconscionable. 16 Another court opined
that if the exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose, the
exclusive remedy clause should be ignored, and other clauses
limiting remedies should be judged independently of the
stricken exclusive remedy clause; the clause excluding consequential damages should thus be enforced if it is not unconscionable.17 In other words, if the exclusive remedy fails of its
essential purpose, plaintiff buyer is entitled to whatever remedies it would have in the absence of the exclusive remedy clause.
Underlying this second group of decisions is an assumption that
the parties allocated to the buyer the risk of consequential
losses, even in the event that the exclusive remedy fails of its
essential purpose.' 8
A third group of decisions makes the buyer's recovery of
consequential damages dependent upon the seller's misconduct.
If the seller willfully or negligently failed to repair or replace the
defective goods, the buyer can recover consequential damages
despite the clause excluding consequential damages; the correlative rule (expressed in some opinions, implied in others) is that
the buyer cannot recover consequential damages if the seller
made a reasonable effort to repair or replace the defective
goods."9 In Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 20 the leading case espousing

this view, the court reasoned that the seller cannot repudiate its
obligation to repair or replace and also enjoy the benefit of the
clause excluding consequential damages. 2' The decisions in this
third group seem to regard the recovery of consequential damages as being contrary to the agreement of the parties, but nev-

16. Id. at 434, 435.
17. County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'g Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300, 1309
(S.D.N.Y.), a/J'd, 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
18. The assumption is made explicit in Chatlos Sys. v. National Cash Register
Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1087 (3d Cir. 1980). None of the opinions in this second group
discusses the reasons for the assumption or attempts to support it.
19. In re Feder Litho-Graphic Servs., 40 Bankr. 486, 487, 489 (E.D. Mich. 1984);
KKO, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 892, 897-98 (N.D. 111. 1981); Tareyton Elec.
Composition, Inc. v. Eltra Corp., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1064, 1078 (M.D.N.C.
1977); Koehring Co. v. A.P.I., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 882, 890-91 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Adams v.
J.I. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 402-03, 261 N.E.2d 1, 7-8 (1970).
20. 125 II. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970).
21. Id. at 402-03, 261 N.E.2d at 7-8.
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ertheless required by equitable or punitive considerations.
In the fourth group of decisions, courts focus upon the contractual intent of the parties rather than the nature of the
seller's conduct. Placement of the exclusive remedy provision
and the exclusion of consequential damages provision in different sections of the written agreement is regarded as virtually
conclusive evidence that the parties intended to allocate to the
buyer the risk of consequential damages, even in the event that
the exclusive repair or replace remedy is ineffectual.2 2
In the fifth line of cases, courts purportedly consider all relevant circumstances in order to ascertain and carry out the intent of the parties regarding who bears the risk of consequential
damages in the event that the exclusive repair or replace remedy
fails of its essential purpose.23 In these cases, courts eschew the
automatic solutions produced in the first and second groups of
cases and also reject the single-factor analyses employed in the
third and fourth groups of cases. The controlling question is:
Did the parties intend that the buyer bear the risk of consequential damages even if the exclusive remedy is ineffectual?
The problem is thus one of contract interpretation and calls for
consideration of all relevant factors. One court stated this approach as follows:
We reject the contention that failure of the essential purpose
of the limited remedy automatically means that a damage
award will include consequential damages ....
An analysis to
determine whether consequential damages are warranted must
carefully examine the individual factual situation including the
type of goods involved, the parties and the precise nature and
purpose of the contract. The purpose of the courts in contractual disputes is not to rewrite contracts by ignoring parties' in-

22. Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F. Supp. 262, 277-78 (D. Me.
1977) (dictum); American Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435,
458 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
23. See Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 761 F.2d 553, 556-57 (9th
Cir. 1985); Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 775 F.2d 587, 591-92 (4th Cir. 1985) (farmer
buyer); Fiorito Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309, 1314-15 (9th Cir. 1984); AES
Technology Sys. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 1978); S.M. Wilson &
Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363, 1375-76 (9th Cir. 1978); Agristor Credit Corp. v.
Schmidlin, 601 F. Supp. 1307, 1315 (D. Or. 1985) (farmer buyer); Clark v. International
Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 343-44, 581 P.2d 784, 801-02 (1978) (farmer buyer); Cayuga
Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95 A.D.2d 5, 13-15, 465 N.Y.S.2d 606, 613-14
(1983).
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tent; rather, it is to interpret the existing contract as fairly as
possible when all events did not occur as planned.2 4
According to another court, "Judging each case and each contract on its own merits will better allow courts to give effect to
the parties' intentions regarding risk allocation and will lead less
frequently to unjust results."2
Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.2 6 provides guidance in
pursuing this case-by-case approach. In Waters the court examined the contract from three different interpretive perspectives. First, it looked at the language used in the text of the written agreement. Next, it considered the creative context of the
contract to determine which party drafted the written terms in
question. Finally, the court looked at the commercial context,
asking two questions: What kind of goods were sold? Would it
be reasonable
to assume that they could be repaired if
27
defective?
B. Evaluation of the Five Approaches
Our survey of five groups of decisions reveals five quite different approaches to our problem. Of these five approaches, four
can be summarily rejected.
The first approach, which holds that when the exclusive
remedy fails of its essential purpose, the buyer is automatically
entitled to consequential damages, should be rejected because it
overlooks the possibility that the buyer agreed to exclude consequential damages even in the event that the exclusive remedy

24. AES Technology Sys. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 1978)
(citations omitted).
25. Fiorito Broa., Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309, 1314-15 (9th Cir. 1984).
26. 775 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1985). Judge Wilkinson's opinion in Waters is one of the
few well-reasoned opinions dealing with our problem.
27. Id. at 591-92. The court found that examination of the contract from each of the
three perspectives led to the conclusion that the exclusion of consequential damages was
not intended to apply to losses resulting from the seller's failure to fix the goods within a
reasonable time and that buyer's consequential losses resulting from the failure of the
exclusive remedy are thus recoverable. Id. In other cases, courts using the case-by-case
interpretive approach have found that the risk of consequential damages was allocated to
the buyer, even in the event that the exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose. See
S.M. Wilson & Co., 587 F.2d at 1375-76; AES Technology Sys., 583 F.2d at 937, 941;
Cayuga Harvester, 95 A.D.2d at 14-15, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 613-14.
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fails. In R.W. Murray, Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp.,2 8 for example, the court followed the first approach and held that the
buyer was automatically entitled to consequential damages, despite the following written provision: "In no event will we [the
seller] be liable for special, incidental or consequential damages
.... "29 The words "in no event" can easily be interpreted to
mean that a buyer cannot recover consequential damages, no
matter what happens (or does not happen), i.e., that the buyer
cannot recover consequential damages even if the defective
goods are never repaired or replaced. The Murray court never
even considered this plausible interpretation of the contract.3 0
The first approach unfortunately leaves the court no opportunity to interpret the contract and carry out the intent of the
parties. Such an opportunity is beneficial and is not foreclosed
by the language in Code section 2-719(2); the words "remedy
may be had as provided in this Act" can reasonably be interpreted to refer to all other Article 2 provisions dealing with remedies for breach of warranty, including provisions like section 2719(3), which permit contractual limitations on remedies.
The second approach, holding that the buyer is automatically precluded from recovering any consequential damages so
long as the exclusion clause is not unconscionable, should be rejected because it overlooks the possibility that the exclusion of
consequential damages was not intended to apply if the exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose. Courts taking this second approach merely assume, without engaging in any serious
contract interpretation, that the agreement allocates to the
buyer the risk of consequential damages in the event that the
seller fails to repair or replace the defective goods. The clause
excluding consequential damages is assumed to have an effect
independent of the exclusive remedy clause and the extent to

28. 758 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1985).
29. Id. at 269.
30. The court was applying what it believed to be Missouri law, and its interpreta-

tion of Missouri law was based in large part on Givan v. Mack Truck, Inc., 569 S.W.2d
243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). See Murray, 758 F.2d at 272. Givan, however, involved a written agreement which apparently did not contain any clause explicitly excluding consequential damages. See 569 S.W.2d at 245-46.
For criticism of judicial failure to consider plausible interpretations of the contract

and try to give effect to the intent of the parties, see Note, The Enforceability of Contractual Clauses Excluding Sellers from Liability for Consequential Damages Under

Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 317, 332-33 (1980).
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which the exclusive remedy is carried out. We will soon see,
however, that buyers may reasonably believe that the exclusion
of consequential damages is intended to apply only if the defects
are corrected. Assuming that the written agreement does not expressly exclude consequential damages in the event that the
seller fails to correct the defects, a question of what the parties
agreed to in this regard remains open. The question calls for
some analysis and should not simply be assumed away.
The third approach makes the buyer's recovery of consequential damages dependent upon the seller's willful or careless
failure to repair or replace defective goods. This approach
should be rejected because a seller's good faith effort, or lack
thereof, is irrelevant to the questions of what the Code requires
and what the parties agreed to. Not even a deliberate breach of
the seller's obligation to repair or replace should give the buyer
remedies to which he is not otherwise entitled. Awarding the
buyer consequential damages he agreed to give up, merely because the seller's failure to correct defects was willful or negligent, is punitive in nature, and the Code expresses a policy
against punitive remedies."
When the seller does make reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to correct the defects, his good faith effort should not diminish the remedies to which the buyer is entitled under the
Code or by way of contractual agreement. Contractual liability
is, in a sense, strict liability, and reasonable efforts to perform
contractual obligations generally do not provide the breaching
party with a defense or reduce his liability. In particular, section
2-719(2) states that the normal Code remedies may be resorted
to when "circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to
fail of its essential purpose." 2 The statutory language seems to
envision any circumstances. As one court noted:
[Subsection (2)] does not specifically require the plaintiff to
prove negligent or willfully dilatory conduct. Rather, the section is to apply whenever an exclusive remedy, which may have
appeared fair and reasonable at the inception of the contract,
as a result of later circumstances operates to deprive a party of
31. See U.C.C. § 1-106(1) & comment 1 (1977) (punitive damages are not compensatory and may be imposed only as specifically provided in the Code or other rule of law).

Article 2 of the Code does not specifically provide for punitive damages.
32. Id. § 2-719(2).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol38/iss4/3

10

Mather: Consequential Damages when Exclusive Repair Remedies Fail: Unifor
EXCLUSIVE REPAIR REMEDIES
19871

a substantial benefit of the bargain. Such circumstances 3may
or
3
may not be the result of dilatory or negligent conduct.
The fourth approach focuses on the location of the exclusive
remedy clause and the exclusion of consequential damages
clause; if these clauses are contained in separate sections of the
written agreement, the exclusion of consequential damages is
deemed to have an effect independent of the failure of the exclusive remedy, and consequential damages are denied. This approach should be rejected because the location of the two clauses
is not conclusive evidence of the parties' intent as to whether the
buyer is to bear the risk of consequential damages in the event
that the exclusive repair or replace remedy is ineffectual. In
most sales contracts, the seller's obligation to deliver the goods
and the buyer's obligation to pay for the goods are specified in
separate sections of the written agreement. It is undoubtedly implied, however, that the buyer does not have to pay for the
goods if they are never delivered; no one could reasonably claim
that the buyer's obligation to pay is independent of the seller's
performance of his delivery obligation.
We are thus left with the fifth approach, an interpretive one
in which the court considers all relevant circumstances in an effort to ascertain the intent of the parties regarding whether the
buyer can recover consequential damages if the exclusive repair
remedy fails of its essential purpose. Of the various approaches
taken by the courts, this seems the most sensible. Assuming that
the court's task is to effectuate the agreement of the parties, all
relevant circumstances should be considered in ascertaining
what that agreement is. 4 We will soon see, however, that discovering the agreement intended by the parties is easier said than
done. As Arthur Corbin noted, "In reading each other's words,

33. Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 340, 581 P.2d 784, 798 (1978)

(citations omitted).
34. See U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1977) ("agreement" means the bargain of the parties as
found in their language or by implication from other circumstances); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(1) (1979) (words and other conduct are interpreted in the light
of all the circumstances); 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 536, at 28 (1960) (in order
to give meaning to the words of a contract, it is necessary to consider extrinsic evidence
of the surrounding circumstances); E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.10, at 492 (1982) (the
overarching principle of contract interpretation is that the court is free to look at all the
relevant circumstances).
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men certainly see through a glass darkly."35
III. PROBLEMS IN INTERPRETATION
In ascertaining the intent of the parties, a good way to begin
is to ask what expectations were probably aroused in the parties
by the written language. 3s We are not interested in just any expectations, of course; we are interested only in expectations that
would be reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances.
In our hypothetical case involving Buyer and Seller, a judge
might ask what reasonable expectations would be aroused by the
written terms concerning remedies for breach of the express
warranty. 37 When the parties signed the agreement, did they expect that Buyer would be entitled to recover consequential damages in the event that Seller fails to repair or replace defective
goods?
A.

Ascertaining the Intent of the Parties:Reasonable
Expectations of Buyer and Seller

Almost as soon as our judge poses the question, she will recognize the likelihood that neither party had any conscious expectation as to what would happen in the event that Seller fails
to repair or replace defective goods. It is quite likely that both
parties assumed that any defects could and would be corrected,
and thus did not think about what might happen if defects are
not corrected. This is especially likely if the goods are of a kind
that normally can be repaired or else replaced with substitute
goods conforming to the warranty.
If the parties did have any expectations (conscious or tacit)
about the damages that Buyer can recover in the event that the
exclusive remedy fails, it is quite possible that they did not have
the same expectations. Seller could have reasonably attached
one meaning to the written terms regarding remedies, and Buyer
could have reasonably attached a very different meaning to
those same terms.

35. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 34, § 535, at 16.

36. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 34, § 7.7, at 478.
37. This hypothetical assumes that the written agreement contains the language set

forth in notes 1 and 2, supra.
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We can imagine Seller's president giving the following account of the meaning he attached to the remedy language:
The agreement states that Seller will not be liable for consequential damages of any kind. This means that Seller will
not be liable for consequential damages no matter what happens-or does not happen. In other words, it means that Seller
will not be liable for consequential damages, even if we fail to
repair or replace defective goods. The exclusion of consequential damages is not expressly conditioned on the exclusive remedy being effective; therefore, I assumed that the exclusion is
not conditional. We knew that Buyer was going to use the
goods in its business, and we did not want to be liable for lost
profits and other consequential damages that could far exceed
the purchase price we were to receive.3s Our intent, therefore,
was to give Buyer the risk of consequential damages, even if
there was a breach of warranty and we were unable to correct
the defects. We fully expected that we would be able to correct
any defects, but we were aware of the possibility that we would
not be able because of circumstances we had not anticipated.
We believed that shifting the risk of all consequential damages
onto Buyer was justified because Buyer could estimate its potential consequential losses better than we could and could
thus insure against them more efficiently. This allocation of
risk was also reflected in the purchase price. If we had agreed
to be liable for consequential damages in the event that we
were unable to correct any breach of warranty by repair or replacement, we would have charged a higher price for our goods.
This is certainly a reasonable interpretation of the written language and a plausible explanation of Seller's intentions and
expectations.
We can also imagine Buyer's president giving the following
account of the meaning he attached to the written terms regarding remedies:
I thought the remedy language meant that if there is a
breach of warranty, Seller would repair or replace defective
goods and, so long as Seller does this, Buyer will have no other

38. One judicial opinion suggested that it defies reason to suppose that the seller in

that case could have intended to assume the risk that its failure to repair or replace
defective parts despite good faith efforts would subject it to liability for consequential
damages many times the value of the goods sold. Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95 A.D.2d 5, 14, 465 N.Y.S.2d 606, 613 (1983).
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remedy and, in particular, will not be able to recover consequential damages. Our waiver of consequential damages assumed that Seller would keep its promise to repair or replace
and was conditioned on that promise being kept.39 In effect, we
were saying to Seller, "If you breach the warranty and repair or
replace defects, we will not ask for consequential damages." As
our legal counsel explained it to us, we were giving up our normal Code remedies in exchange for a repair remedy not
granted in the Code. It was a quid pro quo,4" and we did not
expect the exclusion of consequential damages to be effective if
Seller failed to keep its side of the bargain. We thought we
were merely waiving our right to compensation for consequential losses occurring while the defects are being repaired. We did
not anticipate that we would suffer any other consequential
losses because we assumed that Seller would correct any defects within a reasonable time."1 I do not think it is unreasonable to suppose that Seller agreed to retain the risk of consequential damages in the event that the defects are never
corrected. I realize that such damages might far exceed the

39. In Waters the court found that the written "language reveals an unequivocal
assumption that Massey-Ferguson [the seller] will be able to correct any mechanical
problem in the tractor ....
the contract nowhere suggests-much less provides for-the
possibility that repair may be impossible .... The premise of certain repair informs the
reading of the entire contract." Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 775 F.2d 587, 591 (4th
Cir. 1985). In Clark the court declared:
These various elements of the 'New Equipment Warranty'-the express warranty, the limited repair or replacement remedy, the disclaimer of other warranties, and the exclusion of liability for consequential damages-are all integral parts of the provision, reciprocal to one another, and together they
represent the agreed allocation of risk between the parties. Under these circumstances a seller who fails to comply with its obligations under the warranty, such as its repair or replacement duties, cannot receive the benefit of
the other provisions, which in part at least were premised on the assumption
that the seller would fulfill its obligations. The failure of the limited remedy in
this case would materially alter the balance of risk set by the parties in the
agreement. In such situation we conclude that the other limitations and exclusions on the seller's warranties and liability must also be disregarded and that
the general provisions of the UCC should govern the rights of the parties.
Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 343-44, 581 P.2d 784, 801-02 (1978).
40. See Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions,64
CORNELL L. REV. 30, 239 (1978) (normally, buyer has bargained away his right to consequential damages in reliance on seller's promise to repair or replace; when seller fails to
meet the obligation, the exclusion of consequential damages should collapse).
41. In Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977), the court
suggested that "a buyer when entering into a contract does not anticipate that the sole
remedy available will be rendered a nullity, thus causing additional damages." Id. at
1373.
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purchase price we paid, but Seller may have been confident of
its ability to repair or replace and may have calculated that the
risk of consequential loss was so small that it was advantageous
for Seller to bear that risk rather than shift the risk to us in
exchange for a lower purchase price. 42 For the foregoing reasons, we interpret the written agreement as excluding consequential damages only in the event that the exclusive repair
remedy works as it is supposed to.

This would seem to be a reasonable interpretation from Buyer's
point of view.
Therefore, there appear to be two different ways in which
the contract terms can be reasonably interpreted. A seller could
reasonably expect that consequential damages would be excluded, even if the exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose. A buyer could reasonably assume that the exclusion of
consequential damages does not apply when the exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose. Unfortunately, many judges
who thought they had ascertained the intent of the parties did
not see that both interpretations are reasonable.
It thus appears likely that at the time of contract formation,
Buyer and Seller either did not have any intentions regarding
the recovery of consequential damages in the event that the exclusive remedy fails, or had different, but reasonable, intentions.
Therefore, it would be useless for our judge to search for "the
intention of the parties. ' 4 3 There is no such thing because no
42. Buyer's president has a good point. Presumably, what concerns a seller is its
"expected liability," which is a function of the probability of liability as well as the extent of liability. For example, when there is a 1% probability of $100,000 liability, the
expected liability is .01 x $100,000, or $1000. If the seller is confident of its ability to
repair or replace defects, or confident that a small portion of customers will even have
breach of warranty claims, it may calculate that the expected consequential damages
liability resulting from failure of the repair or replace remedy is so small that it would be
cheaper to bear the risk than to shift the risk to the buyer in exchange for a lower contract price.
It may be cheaper for the seller to bear the risk even when the seller's product is
still in the experimental stage and the risk that seller will be unable to correct defects is
relatively great. It may be more expensive for the buyer to assess the risk of non-repair
and consequential loss and insure against that risk, than it would be for the seller, in
which case the buyer may demand a price reduction exceeding the seller's cost of bearing
the risk itself. In this situation, the seller might well agree to bear the risk of consequential losses resulting from failure of the exclusive remedy.
For a discussion of risk assessment and risk allocation in the warranty context, see
A. SCHWARTZ & R. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 189-94 (1982).
43. One commentator notes that the court carries out the intentions of the parties
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one intention is shared by both parties.4 4 In most cases involving
similar contract terms,4 5 the interpretive approach (the fifth approach examined in part II of this Article) fails. In the absence
of any clearly expressed provision concerning consequential
damages in the event that the repair or replace remedy fails of
its essential purpose, trying to ascertain the agreement intended
by the parties is a futile exercise. Not only is there no express
agreement, there is not even a tacit agreement. Tacit agreements
depend upon usages of trade, other customary ways of doing
business, or obvious mutually beneficial strategies. In most cases
involving the failure of an exclusive repair remedy, no such usage, custom, or strategy appears.
B.

Supplemental Principles of Construction

When our judge abandons all hope of ascertaining the intention of the parties, she may consider some of the traditional
principles of construction that courts employ to give legal effect
to contractual language when no meaning common to both parties can be found.4" These principles sometimes help a judge

only in those rare cases in which both parties attached the same meaning to the language
in question. If the parties attached different meanings, the court must determine which
party's intention is to be carried out at the expense of the other's. If the parties attached
no meaning to the language, thq court must construct a meaning that does not accord
with any intention. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 34, § 7.9, at 492.
44. If Buyer's and Seller's intended meanings differ, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 201 could be applied. If neither party had reason to know of the other
party's intended meaning, or if each party had reason to know of the other party's intended meaning, the result under § 201 would seem to be that neither Buyer nor Seller is
bound by the other party's meaning, and the clause excluding consequential damages
doe3 not determine whether Buyer recovers consequential losses resulting from a failure
of the exclusive remedy. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(2),(3) (1979).
Buyer and Seller are likely to be in such a situation of parity; probably neither had
reason to know the other's meaning, or each had reason to know the other's meaning. In
such a situation, application of the Restatement rule seems to render the exclusion of
consequential damages clause ineffective with respect to consequential damages resulting
from a failure of the exclusive remedy. As for consequential losses occurring during a
reasonable time for repair of defects (losses that would have occurred even if Seller had
performed its repair or replace obligation), both parties intended the same meaning (no
recovery of such losses), and under the Restatement rule, that meaning should be applied by the court. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(1) (1979). My interpretation of the Restatement may not accord with the intention of the drafters, but the result
accords with the solution proposed in parts IV and V of this Article.
45. Le., terms similar to those set forth supra notes 1 & 2.
46. As one court explained:
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choose between two different reasonable interpretations advanced by the litigants.
One principle is that the language in question should be
construed against the drafter.4 7 In other words, in deciding between a reasonable meaning favoring the party who chose the
language and a reasonable meaning favoring the other party, the
court should prefer the meaning of the other party. This is
sometimes an appropriate principle to apply, especially when
one party is a consumer who has no influence on the contract
terms and only a limited understanding of the legal significance
of those terms. In cases such as our hypothetical transaction,
however, both parties are commercial enterprises, most likely
represented by executives experienced in contract bargaining
and by lawyers who understand the legal significance of contractual language. Assuming that the parties had relatively equal
bargaining power, the contractual language concerning warranties and remedies is likely to be a joint product incorporating
some suggestions of seller's counsel and some suggestions of
buyer's counsel.48 In such cases, it is not realistic to identify either party as the drafter. Even if the language was supplied by
one party, the court should not automatically prefer the meaning advanced by the other. That other party had an opportunity
to require clarification of the drafter's language and must share
the blame for the ambiguity concerning consequential damages.
One must conclude that in many cases the principle of construing contractual language against the drafter does not provide an
adequate solution to our problem.
Another principle of construction prescribes that contractual terms be given a meaning that results in a reasonable and

[Tihe first task of a court in contract interpretation is determining from the
agreement itself and the surrounding circumstances what the intent of the parties was. If, after examining all these sources of information, it is still not possible to determine the intent of the parties, courts can rely on rules of law
which purport to determine what, in certain circumstances the parties intended, when, in fact, no one really knows what was intended or that the parties even thought about the matter.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 399 F.2d 854, 856 (5th Cir. 1968).
47. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

§ 206 (1979); E. FARNSWORTH, supra

note 34, § 7.11, at 499.
48. For an example of a commercial contract in which both parties played active
roles in drafting contract language, see Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F.
Supp. 262, 265-68 (D. Me. 1977).
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fair bargain.49 It is difficult to see how this principle could help
our judge. We are assuming that Buyer and Seller are commercial enterprises and that the clause excluding consequential
damages is not unconscionable. Seller's interpretation of that
clause does not seem unfair; it merely shifts to Buyer the risk of
all consequential damages. This is frequently done in commercial contracts when the buyer is the better risk-bearer. If the
written agreement had excluded consequential damages and
failed to provide an exclusive remedy, Buyer could not recover
any consequential damages, and no one would argue that that
was unfair. Nor does Buyer's interpretation of the exclusion
clause seem unfair to Seller. It is not unfair to ask Seller to compensate for losses resulting from breach of Seller's obligation to
correct defects in the goods. Our problem is not one of fairness
or unfairness; Buyer and Seller were morally free to allocate the
risk of consequential damages in any manner they desired. Unfortunately, they left it unclear how that risk was allocated and
thereby committed the venial sin of ambiguity.
According to yet another principle of construction, a contract term should be given a meaning that makes it significant
and effective, rather than superfluous or redundant.50 In Buyer's
interpretation, the exclusion of consequential damages clause
seems to be a redundant particularization of the exclusive remedy clause; the exclusive remedy clause already states that repair or replacement is the only remedy for breach of warranty,
and Buyer interprets the exclusion of consequential damages
clause as a mere reminder that consequential damages is one of
the remedies waived in reliance on the exclusive repair remedy.
In Seller's interpretation, on the other hand, the exclusion of
consequential damages clause has a very significant effect. It
means that Buyer cannot recover consequential damages, no
matter what happens, including Seller's failure to correct defects. Unlike the meaning Buyer advocates, this is a meaning
that cannot be derived from other provisions in the written
agreement. Any sane judge would not, however, adopt Seller's
interpretation merely because it makes the consequential damages clause logically significant rather than redundant. Written

49. See
FARNSWORTH,

50. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 203(a) & comment c (1979); E.

supra note 34, § 7.11, at 498.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
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agreements often contain emphatic reminders, clarifying examples, and other language that might be regarded as redundant.
Buyer may reasonably have assumed that the consequential
damages clause was an emphatic reminder, in which case it
would be repetitive but not superfluous.
We must conclude that in most cases involving failure of the
exclusive repair remedy,5 1 courts will not be able to ascertain the
intent of the parties concerning consequential damages or resolve the issue through traditional principles of construction.
Yet the contract must be given legal effect one way or the other;
the court must decide either that the buyer is entitled to consequential damages or that it is not.
IV. A PROPOSED PRESUMPTION
The problem can best be solved by the following presumption: In the absence of an explicit or clear indication to the
contrary, it should be presumed that the buyer agreed to exclude consequential damages only on the condition that defects
are corrected by repair or replacement within a reasonable
time.2

51. Assuming contract terms similar to those set forth supra notes 1 & 2.
52. A similar approach is proposed in Special Project, supra note 40, at 239 n.884,
which suggests that it should be presumed the parties did not intend to exclude consequential damages flowing from a failure of essential purpose. This presumption is rebuttable, however: "The seller should be allowed to demonstrate a contrary intent". Id. The
presumption proposed in this Article, on the other hand, is conclusive once it is deemed
applicable. It comes into play in the absence of an explicit or clearly implied agreement
that consequential damages will be excluded even if the exclusive remedy fails of its
essential purpose. The presumption should be conclusive because consequential damages
should be denied only when it is unmistakably clear that both parties agreed to their
exclusion. See infra text accompanying notes 59 & 60.
When the seller is the sole drafter of the limitation of remedy language, my proposed presumption yields the same result as that produced by the principle of construing
language against the drafter. When the limitation of remedy language is the joint product of the seller's and the buyer's suggestions, neither party can be identified as the
drafter, and my proposed presumption resolves an issue that cannot be resolved by the
principle of construing language against the drafter. In the unlikely event that the buyer
is the sole drafter of the limitation of remedy language, my proposed presumption and
the principle of construing language against the drafter produce different results. My
proposed presumption is supported by the policy of limiting remedies only when it is
unmistakably clear that both parties agreed to the limitation. This important policy outweighs the principle of construing language against the drafter, a principle which has
little weight when the parties have roughly equal bargaining power. Assuming the parties
had roughly equal bargaining power, one may therefore suppose that the seller had am-
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There are good reasons for the proposed presumption.
Sometimes the best way to "solve" a problem is to prevent it
from occurring. Our problem is one of ambiguity. One way to
prevent this ambiguity is to impose upon one party the burden
of ensuring that the contract language clearly specifies which
party is to bear the risk of consequential damages in the event
the exclusive repair remedy fails of its essential purpose. This
gives one party in each transaction a strong incentive to insist on
language that is unambiguous; he knows that any ambiguity will
be resolved against him.
Why put the burden on the seller, as the proposed presumption does, rather than the buyer? There are practical reasons for
so doing. The seller already has the burden of carefully drafting
an implied warranty disclaimer that complies with Code section
2-316.6s The seller already has the burden of clearly expressing
an agreement that the repair or replace remedy is the sole and
exclusive remedy for breach of warranty54 The additional burden of ensuring clarity in the consequential damages clause is
therefore not an onerous one for the seller to bear, and it seems
convenient to assign to one party the major responsibility for the
clarity and coherence of all provisions limiting remedies for
breach of warranty.
There are also policy reasons for placing the burden on the
seller and resolving ambiguity in the buyer's favor. The general
goal of the Code provisions dealing with remedies for breach is
to afford plaintiffs fully compensatory expectancy damages."
When a buyer suffers consequential loss because of seller's
breach, full compensation requires consequential damages. The
Code provides for consequential damages as a normal remedy
for buyers, subject to limitations prescribed in Code section 2715(2)(a)."6 The Code also permits contractual limitations of
remedies, limitations which exclude one or more of the normal

pie opportunity to require clarification of any ambiguous language drafted by the buyer.
53. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1977) (noting requirements for exclusion of implied
warranties).
54. See id. § 2-719(1)(b) & comment 2.
55. These are damages designed to put the plaintiff in the position he would be in
had the breach not occurred. See id. § 1-106(1).
56. See supra notes 7 & 8 and authority cited therein. Although U.C.C. § 1-106(1)
states that consequential damages may be recovered only as specifically provided, the
U.C.C. sections cited in notes 7 and 8 specifically provide for consequential damages.
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Code remedies and thus give the victim of the breach something
other than compensatory expectancy damages. Such limitations,
however, are not favored in the Code." The Code contains provisions restricting the right to substitute limited remedies for
the normal Code remedies, and also provides that certain limitations of remedies will be enforced only when expressed in clear
and unmistakable language.58 One might well conclude that the
general policy of the Code is to prescribe fully compensatory
remedies and enforce contractual deviations from these prescribed remedies only when it is unmistakably clear that both
parties agreed to the deviation."
In our hypothetical case, the meaning of the clause excluding consequential damages is not clear. The parties obviously
agreed to exclude consequential damages in the event that Seller
57. E.g., Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp. 245, 250 (N.D. Ill.
1974), afl'd, 522 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1975); Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago S., 310

N.W.2d 71, 78 (Minn. 1981); Goddard v. General Motors Corp., 60 Ohio St. 2d 41, 44,
396 N.E.2d 761, 764 (1979); Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 261, 544

P.2d 20, 24 (1975); Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 418, 265 N.W.2d
513, 520 (1978).
58. See U.C.C. § 2-718(1) & comment 1 (1977) (restricting liquidation of damages);
id. § 2-719(1)(b) & comment 2 (giving effect to exclusive remedy clause only if clearly
expressed); id. § 2-719(2) (making normal Code remedies available when exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose); id. § 2-719(3) (giving effect to exclusion of consequential damages only if exclusion is conscionable); cf. id. § 2-316(2) (requiring that disclaimers of implied warranties be conspicuous); id. § 2-720 (requiring clear expression of any
renunciation of remedies for antecedent breach in event of cancellation or rescission of
contract). For judicial suggestions that contractual limitations of remedies must be in
clear and unmistakable language, see Cryogenic Equip., Inc. v. Southern Nitrogen, Inc.,
490 F.2d 696, 698 (8th Cir. 1974); Gramling v. Baltz, 253 Ark. 361, 362-63, 485 S.W.2d
183, 189-90 (1972).
59. To be sure, one can also find in the U.C.C. a policy respecting the freedom of the
parties to fashion their own remedies. See U.C.C. § 2-718 comment 1 (1977) (upholding
liquidated damages clauses when the liquidated amount is reasonable); id. § 2-719 comment 1 (parties are left free to shape their remedies, and reasonable agreements limiting
remedies are to be given effect). The best way to reconcile the freedom of contract policy
with the policy favoring the normal compensatory Code remedies is to enforce contractual limitations of remedies, but only when they are expressed in clear and unmistakable
langauge. A party should be free to contract away his statutory rights, but we should
require clear and convincing evidence before concluding that he has done so.
This disposes of any argument that the seller's interpretation of the consequential
damages clause should prevail if it is more reasonable, in view of all the circumstances,
than buyer's contrary interpretation. So long as the buyer's interpretation is reasonable,
there is no mutual assent to the exclusion of consequential damages when the exclusive
remedy fails, see supra pt. III, and buyer's interpretation should prevail simply because
buyer has not clearly and unmistakably waived his statutory right to those consequential
damages.
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performs its obligation to repair or replace defects, but Buyer
could reasonably have expected to recover consequential damages in the event that the defects are not corrected, despite
Seller's contrary understanding. Under the proposed presumption, the court would find that Buyer agreed to exclude consequential damages only on the condition that the exclusive remedy does not fail, and the court would conclude that Buyer is
entitled to consequential damages because the exclusive remedy
did fail. The presumption serves the Code policy by excluding
consequential damages only to the extent that both parties
clearly agreed to exclude them.6 0
V.

THE LIMITED SCOPE OF RECOVERY

In our hypothetical case, the proposed presumption results
in the court holding that Buyer is entitled to consequential damages because the exclusive repair remedy failed. Buyer should
not, however, recover all consequential losses caused by Seller's
breach of warranty. In addition to the usual foreseeability requirement, two additional limitations should restrict the scope
of recovery.
The first limitation is imposed by the agreement of the parties. Seller promised to remedy any breach of warranty by repairing or replacing defective parts. The written agreement did

60. If the buyer agrees to bear the risk of consequential damages, no matter what
happens, the seller should insist on language such as the following: "Seller will not be
liable for consequential damages even if Seller fails to repair or replace defective equipment or the exclusive remedy in any way fails of its essential purpose." Such language
avoids ambiguity and makes it clear that the buyer is waiving all consequential damages
for breach of warranty; the proposed presumption would therefore not come into play.
A buyer who does not want to exclude consequential damages in the event that defects are not corrected should insist on language such as the following: "Provided that
Seller performs its obligations under the exclusive repair or replacement remedy within a
reasonable time not to exceed
- after notification of breach of warranty, Seller will
not be liable for cor.,equential damages." Language such as this makes the proposed
presumption unnecessary.
A difficult problem arises when the contract provides that "In no event will Seller be
liable for consequential damages." This seems to indicate that the buyer has agreed to
exclude consequential damages even if the exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose.
The buyer can argue, however, that it means "So long as defects are corrected by repair
or replacement, Seller will not be liable for consequential damages arising in any situation or circumstances." My somewhat tentative view is that the meaning of the language
is not clear and unmistakable and that the proposed presumption should therefore be
applied.
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not specify the period of time within which the repair or replacement must be accomplished, and thus, under Code section 2309(1), Seller is given a reasonable time.6 ' Under both Seller's
and Buyer's interpretations of the agreement, Seller is not liable
for consequential damages or other money damages if Seller
meets its obligation to repair or replace defective parts. An obvious purpose of the exclusive repair remedy is to give Seller a
reasonable time in which to correct defects, during which time
Seller will be free of liability. Buyer clearly intended to waive
consequential damages for losses occurring during that reasonable time period. We thus arrive at the first limitation on Buyer's
recovery of consequential damages: Buyer cannot recover for
consequential losses that would have occurred even if defects
had been corrected within a reasonable time. 2
When does the reasonable time period expire? A reasonable
time for correction of defects should not be deemed to expire
until Buyer notifies Seller that Seller has had long enough.6 3 So
long as this notification is not premature, the time of notification can be used as the termination of Seller's reasonable time
for correcting defects. In deciding that the notification was not
premature, the finder of fact need not fix the precise time period
during which any notification would have been premature; it
need only determine that the time of actual notification lies
outside that period, whatever it may be. If the finder of fact de-

61. "The time for shipment or delivery or any other action under a contract if not
provided in this Article or agreed upon shall be a reasonable time." U.C.C. § 2-309(1)
(1977). In Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978), the'
court correctly noted that if the contract does not state the time for performance of the
repair or replacement obligation, the seller is obligated to repair or replace defective
parts within a reasonable time pursuant to § 2-309(1). Id. at 340, 581 P.2d at 798.
62. See Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 775 F.2d 587, 591- 92 (4th Cir. 1985) (exclusion of consequential damages should be interpreted as referring to damages incurred
during a reasonable time for repair); Special Project, supra note 40, at 239 (buyer should
recover only those consequential damages flowing from the limited remedy's failure and
should not recover consequential damages arising during the seller's reasonable time for
correction of defects). Unfortunately, most courts awarding consequential damages have
failed to mention the limitation.
63. See U.C.C. § 2-309 comment 5 (1977), which states in part:
The obligation of good faith under this Act requires reasonable notification before a contract may be treated as breached because a reasonable time
for delivery or demand has expired . . ..
When both parties let an originally reasonable time go by in silence, the
course of conduct under the contract may be viewed as enlarging the reasonable time for tender or demand of performance.
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cides that the notification was premature, it will have to consider the relevant circumstances of the case in fixing Seller's reasonable time for correcting defects.
The second limitation on Buyer's recovery of consequential
damages is imposed by Code section 2-715(2)(a): Buyer cannot
recover for losses that Buyer could reasonably have prevented
by cover or other attempts to mitigate damages." Once Buyer
notifies Seller that a reasonable time for correction of defects
has expired, Buyer should no longer rely on Seller and should
immediately begin attempts to obtain substitute goods from another supplier. Any delay on Buyer's part should result in the
denial of consequential damages for losses that could have been
avoided by timely cover.
The combined effect of the first and second limitations can
be illustrated by figure 1, in which TI represents the time of
delivery of the goods; T2 represents the date on which Seller is
notified of the breach of warranty; T3 represents the date on
which Seller is notified that a reasonable time for repair or replacement has expired, assuming that this notice is not premature; and T4 represents the latest date for timely cover by
Buyer, assuming cover is possible.
Figure 1

Period A

_+

Period B +

_

T,

T

T.

T,

Delivery

Notice
of breach

Expiration
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time for repair
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date for
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Consequential losses that would have occurred, even if the defects had been corrected by time T3, can be regarded as losses
arising during period A, the period terminating when Seller's
reasonable time for repair or replacement expires. Under the
first limitation, Seller should not be held liable for these losses.
Consequential losses that would have been avoided had Buyer

64. Id. § 2-715(2)(a).
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covered no later than time T4 can be regarded as losses arising
during period C, the period during which any cover is tardy.
Under the second limitation, Seller should not be held liable for
these losses. Buyer should recover consequential damages only
for losses that were caused by Seller's failure to correct defects
within a reasonable time and that could not have been avoided
by Buyer's timely cover: losses arising during period B." If
Buyer has purchased goods of a kind readily available in the
marketplace, period B will be brief, and Buyer will be left with a
very narrow window of recovery. In many cases, the proposed
presumption gives buyers a hollow victory.
VI. CONCLUSION

A problem arises under Code section 2-719 when an exclusive repair remedy fails of its essential purpose and the written
agreement contains a clause excluding consequential damages.
Due largely to their failure to see that differing but reasonable
interpretations of the agreement are possible, courts have produced conflicting and unsatisfactory resolutions of the problem.
The solution proposed in this Article is fairly simple: In the absence of a clear indication to the contrary, it should be presumed
that the buyer agreed to exclude consequential damages only on
the condition that defects in the goods are corrected within a
reasonable time; the buyer should thus be allowed to recover
consequential damages, but only for losses that were caused by
the seller's failure to correct defects within a reasonable time
and that could not have been avoided by the buyer's timely
cover or other reasonable efforts to mitigate damages. Buyers
should expect neither more nor less from judges who must see
through a glass darkly, but are not blind.

65. See Anderson, Failure of Essential Purpose and Essential Failureon Purpose:
A Look at Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 Sw. L.J. 759, 775-76
(1977).
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